We study three stochastic differential games. In each game, two players control a process X = {X t , 0 ≤ t < ∞} which takes values in the interval I = (0, 1), is absorbed at the endpoints of I, and satisfies a stochastic differential equation
Preliminaries
The state space for the two-player games studied in this paper, is the interval I = (0, 1). For each x ∈ [0, 1], players A and B are given nonempty action sets A(x) and B(x), respectively. For simplicity, we assume that A(x) and B(x) are Borel sets of the real line R.
Denote 
of a diffusion process X ≡ X x,α,β that lives in the interval I and is absorbed the first time it reaches either of the endpoints. Here W = {W t , 0 ≤ t < ∞} is a standard, one-dimensional Brownian motion, and the functions µ( · , (in other words, both endpoints are absorbing). The first of these conditions implies, in particular, that the resulting diffusion process
is regular: it exits in finite expected time from any open neighborhood (x − ε, x + ε) ⊂ I (cf. Karatzas & Shreve (1991) , p.344).
If τ is a stopping rule, we often write X τ as abbreviation for a random variable that equals X τ (X) when τ (X) is finite on the path {X t , 0 ≤ t < ∞} . Also, for a bounded and measurable function u : [0, 1] → R , we set
A Zero-Sum Game
Assume player A selects the control function α(·) and a stopping rule τ , whereas player B has only the choice of the control function β(·) . Let u : [0, 1] → R be a continuous function, which we regard as a reward function for player A. Then the expected payoff from player B to player A is
where X ≡ X x,α,β and the game begins at X 0 = x ∈ I . Assume further that u(·) attains its maximum value at a unique position m ∈ [0, 1] . Call this game G 1 (x) .
Optimal strategies for the players have a simple intuitive description: In the interval (0, m) to the left of the maximum, player A chooses a control function α * (·) that maximizes the "signalto-noise" (mean/variance) ratio µ/σ 2 , whereas player B chooses a control function β * (·) that minimizes this ratio. In the interval (m, 1) to the right of the maximum, player A chooses α * (·) to minimize µ/σ 2 , whereas player B chooses β * (·) to maximize it. Finally, player A takes the stopping rule τ * to be optimal for maximizing E[ u(Z τ ) ] over all stopping rules τ of the diffusion process Z ≡ X x,α * , β * , namely
with drift and dispersion coëfficients given by
respectively. More precisely, we impose the following condition.
holds for every z ∈ (0, m) ; and
holds for every z ∈ (m, 1) .
Remark 1: For fixed z, the existence of α * (z), β * (z) satisfying the condition C.1 corresponds to the existence of optimal strategies for a "local" (one-shot) game with action sets A(z) and B(z), and with payoff given by (µ/σ 2 )(z, a, b) for 0 < z < m and by (−µ/σ 2 )(z, a, b) for m < z < 1 . Such strategies exist, for example, if (µ/σ 2 )(z, · , · ) is continuous, and the sets A(z), B(z) are compact for every z ∈ I .
Suppose that the local saddle-point condition C.1 holds, and recall the diffusion process Z ≡ X x,α * , β * of (2.1), (2.2) for a fixed initial position x ∈ I . Fix an arbitrary point η of I, and write the scale function of Z as
where we have set 
where τ ranges over the set S of all stopping rules, and consider the element τ * of S given by
Then for each x , the game G 1 (x) has value U (x) and saddle-point (α * (·), τ * ), β * (·) . Namely, the pair (α * (·), τ * ) is optimal for player A, when player B chooses β * (·) ; and the function β * (·) is optimal for player B, when player A chooses (α * (·), τ * ) .
Before broaching the proof of this result, let us recall some well-known facts from the theory of optimal stopping (as developed, for instance, in Snell (1952) , Chow et al. (1971) , Neveu (1975) or Shiryaev (1978) ). The function U (·) of (2.3) is the value function for the optimal stopping problem associated with the random process u(
it is obviously bounded, because the reward function u(·) is continuous (therefore bounded) on the compact interval [0,1]. In addition, the function U (·) is known to be continuous, and the stopping rule τ * to be optimal: i.e., U (x) = E[ u(Z x τ * ) ] (see, for example, Shiryaev (1978) ). Furthermore,
where U (·) is the least concave majorant of the function u(·) defined through
for instance, see Karatzas & Sudderth (1999) or Dayanik & Karatzas (2003) , pp.178-181. The process Y ≡ Y y := p(Z x ) is easily seen to be a "diffusion in natural scale", that is,
where
The function U (·) is the value function of the optimal stopping problem for the process u(Y ) with starting point Y 0 = y ∈ I ; to wit,
We shall refer to this as the "auxiliary optimal stopping problem".
As the least concave majorant of u(·) , the function U (·) is clearly increasing on the interval (p(0+), m) and decreasing on the interval ( m, p(1−)) , where m := p(m) is the unique point at which the function u(·) attains its maximum over the interval I . Furthermore, the function U (·) is affine on the connected components of the open set
the optimal continuation region for the auxiliary stopping problem. Consequently, the positive measure ν defined by
assigns zero mass to the set O :
is the optimal continuation region for the original stopping problem.
Proof of Theorem 1: Let α(·)
and β(·) be arbitrary control functions for the two players, and let τ ∈ S be an arbitrary stopping rule for player A . Consider the processes
It suffices to show
Indeed, these inequalities mean that the pair (α * (·), τ * ) is optimal for player A, when player B chooses β * (·) ; and that β * (·) is optimal for player B, when player A chooses (α * (·), τ * ) .
In other words, (α * (·), τ * ) , β * (·) is a saddle-point for the game G 1 (x) , and this game has value
equal to the middle term in (2.5) . This is the same as the value U (x) of the optimal stopping problem for the diffusion process Z, as in (2.3). Furthermore, it suffices to prove (2.5) when m = 1, to wit, when the maximum of u(·) occurs at the right-endpoint of I. This is because it is obviously optimal for player A to stop at m, so the intervals (0, m) and (m, 1) can be treated separately and similarly.
• To prove the second inequality of (2.5), consider the semimartingale H := p(H) which satisfies
where we have set
By condition C.1 and the positivity of p (·) , we have
2). Therefore, the process H = p(H) is a local submartingale. Now let us look at the semimartingale U (H t ) = U ( H t ), 0 ≤ t < ∞ . By the generalized Itô rule for concave functions (cf. Karatzas & Shreve (1991) , section 3.7), this process satisfies
We are using the notation L Υ T (ζ) for the local time of a continuous semimartingale Υ , accumulated by calendar time T at the site ζ . The last integral of (2.7) is equal to
and therefore vanishes for T = τ * (H) ; just recall that ν( O) = 0 , O = p(O) , and observe that the stopping rule τ * (H) of (2.4) can be written as
Thus, the nonnegativity of D − U (·) and of the term in brackets on the second line of (2.7) guarantee that U (H ·∧τ * ) is a bounded local submartingale, hence a (bounded, and genuine) submartingale. Consequently, the optional sampling theorem gives
For this last equality, we have used (2.8) and the property τ * (X) < ∞ a.s., for every process X ≡ X x,α,β as in (1.1);
this is a consequence of the strong non-degeneracy condition C.2. Since
, the proof of the second inequality in (2.5) is now complete.
• To verify the first inequality of (2.5), namely
we observe that an analysis of the processes Θ := p(Θ) and U ( Θ) ≡ U (Θ) , similar to that carried out above, shows they are local supermartingales, and that U (Θ) is a genuine supermartingale because it is bounded. By the optional sampling theorem we obtain then
for an arbitrary stopping rule τ ∈ S . 2 Remark 2: Before proceeding to the next section it is useful to recall that, in the special case where player B is a dummy, we have solved a one-person game control-and-stopping problem for player A. That is, against any fixed control function β(·) for player B, it is optimal for player A to choose an α(·) that maximizes (µ/σ 2 ) to the left of m and minimizes (µ/σ 2 ) to the right of m; and then to choose a rule τ which is optimal for stopping the process
This essentially recovers, and slightly extends, the main result of Karatzas & Sudderth (1999) .
General results about the existence of values for zero-sum stochastic differential games have been established in the literature, using both analytical and probabilistic tools; see, for instance, As in the previous section, the two players choose control functions α(·) and β(·) , but now we assume that both players can select stopping rules, say τ and ρ respectively. The dynamics of the process X ≡ X x,α, β are given by (1.1), just as before. The expected rewards to the two players resulting from their choices of (α(·), τ ) and (β(·), ρ) at the initial state x ∈ I are defined to be
respectively. Let G 2 (x) denote this game.
As this game is typically not zero-sum, we seek a Nash equilibrium: namely, pairs (α * (·), τ * ) and (β * (·), ρ * ) such that
and
This simply says that the choice (α * (·), τ * ) is optimal for player A when player B uses (β * (·), ρ * ) , and vice-versa.
Speaking intuitively: in positions to the left of the point , both players want the process X to move to the right; in the interval ( , m), player A wants the process to move to the right, and player B wants it to move to the left; and at positions to the right of m, both players prefer X to move to the left. Here, "moving to the right" (resp., to the left) is a euphemism for "trying to maximize (resp., to minimize) the signal-to-noise ratio (µ/σ 2 ) "; recall the discussion in Remark 4.1 of Karatzas & Sudderth (1999) , in connection with the problem of that paper and with the goal problem of Pestien & Sudderth (1985) .
These considerations suggest the following condition.
C.3: Local Nash Equilibrium Condition. There exist measurable functions
holds for every z ∈ ( , m) ; and
Suppose there exist measurable functions α * (·) and β * (·) that satisfy condition C.3, and construct, for each fixed x ∈ I , the diffusion process Z x ≡ X x,α * , β * of (2.1), (2.2). Next, consider the optimal stopping problems for these two players with value functions
respectively. Define also the stopping rules .1) and (2.2) . Then the pairs (α * (·), τ * ) and (β * (·), ρ * ) form a Nash equilibrium for the game G 2 (x) .
Proof : Consider the control-and-stopping problem faced by player A, when player B chooses the pair (β * (·), ρ * ) . By condition C.3, the control function α * (·) maximizes the ratio (µ/σ 2 ) to the left of m, and minimizes it to the right of m. Also, the rule τ * is optimal for stopping the process u(Z x ) (player A). Thus, by Remark 2 at the end of section 2, we see that the pair (α * (·), τ * ) is optimal for player A when player B chooses the pair (β * (·), ρ * ) .
Similar considerations show that the pair (β * (·), ρ * ) is optimal for player B when player A chooses the pair (α * (·), τ * ) .
2
It is not difficult to extend Theorem 2 to any finite number of players. General existence results for Nash equilibria in non-zero-sum stochastic differential games have been established in the literature; see, for instance, Uchida (1978 Uchida ( , 1979 
A General Game of Stopping
In this section we address a game of stopping, which will be crucial to our study of the controland-stopping game in the next section. This stopping game is a cousin of the so-called Dynkin (1967) Games, which have been studied by a number of authors; see, for instance, Friedman (1973), Bensoussan & Friedman (1974 , 1977 , Neveu (1975) Let X be a locally compact metric space and suppose that, for each x ∈ X , the process Z x = {Z x t , 0 ≤ t < ∞} is a continuous strong Markov process with Z x 0 = x and values in the space X. We shall assume that Z x is standard in the sense of Shiryaev (1978) , p.19. (For the application to the next section, Z x will be a diffusion process in the interval (0,1) with absorption at the endpoints, just as it was in sections 2 and 3.) Consider now, for each x ∈ X, a two-person game G 3 (x) in which players A and B have bounded, continuous reward functions u(·) and v(·), respectively, that map X into the real line. Player A chooses a stopping rule τ , player B chooses a stopping rule ρ, and their respective expected rewards are
. The resulting non-zero-sum game of timing has a trivial Nash equilibriumτ =ρ = 0 , which leaves player A with reward u(x) and player Bwith reward v(x). A somewhat less trivial Nash equilibrium is described in Theorem 3 and its proof below.
Theorem 3:
There exist stopping rules τ * and ρ * such that
hold for each x ∈ X , to wit, the game G 3 (x) has (τ * , ρ * ) as a Nash equilibrium; in this equilibrium the expected rewards of players A and B satisfy
respectively; and the inequalities of (4.1) can typically be strict.
The stopping rules τ * , ρ * of the theorem will be constructed as limits of two decreasing sequences {τ n } and {ρ n } of stopping rules. The specific structure of these sequences will be important for the application we undertake in the next section.
These stopping rules will be defined inductively, in the order τ 1 , ρ 1 , τ 2 , ρ 2 , · · · , as solutions to a sequence of optimal stopping problems. First, let us define
It is well known (e.g. Shiryaev (1978) ) that the stopping rules τ 1 and ρ 1 are optimal in their respective problems, in the sense that
and that the functions U 1 (·) , V 1 (·) are continuous. Thus the optimal stopping regions for these two problems, namely, F 1 and G 1 , are closed sets.
Suppose now that we have already constructed: the stopping rules τ 1 , ρ 1 , · · · , τ n , ρ n ; the continuous functions U 1 (·) , V 1 (·) , · · · , U n (·) , V n (·) ; and the closed sets
as well as
Observe that
Thus F 1 ⊆ F 2 and so τ 1 ≥ τ 2 . Similarly, G 1 ⊆ G 2 and ρ 1 ≥ ρ 2 . An argument by induction shows that τ n ≥ τ n+1 and ρ n ≥ ρ n+1 , as well as
hold for all n ∈ N .
Also by construction, we have
for all integers n and stopping rules τ , ρ. Define the decreasing limits
and let n → ∞ in (4.3), (4.4). The above construction shows also that, for every integer n ∈ N , the functions U n (·) , V n (·) are continuous and the sets F n , G n closed.
On the other hand, it is clear that the inequalities in (4.1) can be strict. For instance, take u(·) ≡ v(·) and suppose that the optimal stopping problem of (4.2) is not trivial, that is, has a non-empty optimal continuation region
For every x ∈ O 1 , the inequalities in (4.1) are then strict, since
Remark 3:
It is straightforward to generalize Theorem 3 to the case of K ≥ 2 players with reward functions u 1 (·), · · · , u K (·) , who choose stopping rules τ 1 , · · · , τ K and receive payoffs
5 Another Non-Zero-Sum Game of Control and Stopping
For each point x in the interval I = (0, 1), let G 4 (x) be a two-player game which is the same as the game G 2 (x) of section 3, except that the payoffs to the two players, resulting from their choices (α(·), τ ) and (β(·), ρ) , are now, respectively,
Just like the game of the previous section, this one has the trivial Nash equilibrium (α(·),τ ) and (β(·),ρ) , with arbitraryα(·),β(·) and withτ =ρ = 0 .
A somewhat less trivial equilibrium for this game is constructed in Theorem 4 below. It uses the additional assumption that the reward functions u(·) and v(·) are unimodal with unique maxima at m and , respectively, and with 0 ≤ ≤ m ≤ 1 . To say that u(·) , for example, is unimodal, means that u(·) is increasing on the interval (0, m) and decreasing on the interval (m, 1). Then the same analysis as in the proof of Theorem 1, leads to the comparisons
as in (2.5), for an arbitrary stopping time t of the filtration F.
In other words: the pair (α * (·), τ * ) is optimal for player A against all such pairs (a, t) , and the function β * (·) is optimal for player B against all such b.
